Seth Blumsack, Penn State

President Donald Trump’s declaration of a “national energy emergency” on his first day in office – and which he reiterated during his address to Congress on March 4, 2025 – might have seemed to echo other national emergencies, like those presidents declared in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

But there has never before been a national energy emergency. During the energy crises of the 1970s, President Jimmy Carter declared local or regional energy emergencies in a handful of states. These actions suspended some environmental regulations, such as air-pollution limits for coal-fired power plants, for very short periods to make sure those states’ residents had enough electricity.

When a president declares a national emergency, he claims significant powers under the National Emergencies Act, which allow him to take steps to solve the emergency. In this situation, Trump might seek to override environmental regulations, order utility companies to buy power from particular power plants, or invoke the Defense Production Act to secure materials needed for power plant construction.

Six weeks into his presidency, Trump had not taken any action to address this emergency, though during his speech to Congress he said he wants to increase drilling and build a new natural gas pipeline in Alaska. And Trump’s discussion of energy policy has not directly referred to the consumer price hikes expected as a result of the 10% tariffs he imposed on Canadian oil, gas and electricity starting on March 4, 2025.

Critics of the president’s declaration have described it as a “giveaway” to the fossil fuel industry in the form of looser regulations and measures to make it easier to drill for oil on government-owned land. In fact, the executive order’s definition of “energy” excludes energy generated from wind and solar, as well as efforts to conserve energy – all of which were major parts of the Biden administration’s energy strategy.

As someone who has studied energy markets for decades, I have seen several events that might qualify as energy-related emergencies, such as meltdowns at nuclear power plants around the world, shortages of electricity and natural gas, and massive power blackouts.

But over the past 15 years, the United States has become a global energy superpower even without any emergency declarations. The advent of hydraulic fracturing unleashed a wave of oil and gas production, even as U.S. energy demand barely budged. In a time of such energy abundance, there is no clear emergency on the scale of the energy crises of the 1970s. But there are some causes for concern.

Big increases in domestic production

One goal Trump’s declaration sets out is to increase what the executive order calls the nation’s “energy security.” Usually that phrase refers to an ability to operate using energy produced within the U.S. rather than overseas – particularly from countries that have long-standing conflicts or disagreements with the United States.

Based on raw numbers, however, the U.S. is already quite energy secure. In 2023, the nation produced nearly 13 million barrels of oil per day, which is more than any country has ever produced in the history of the oil business. Since 2015, when a federal ban on oil exports was lifted, the U.S. has been increasing the amount of oil it exports every year. And for the past several years, the U.S. has been the world’s leading exporter of gasoline, sending 10% of its total annual production to other countries.

Since the start of the shale-fracking boom in the mid-2000s, U.S. production of natural gas has also been increasing. The country’s natural gas exports have also risen over the past 10 years, though they have been limited by the number of ports that can handle liquefied natural gas cargo.

Still a net importer of oil

The U.S. produces plenty of oil to meet its demands, but not the kinds of oil that American refineries are designed to process into useful fuels.

Therefore, despite the increases in domestic production, the U.S. is still a net importer of crude oil. In 2023, the U.S. imported almost twice as much oil as it exported.

And U.S. refineries’ output of gasoline and heating oil depends on imported oil. Most oil refineries in the U.S. are quite old and were engineered to process so-called “heavy” crude oil produced in countries such as Canada, which is historically the United States’ biggest source of imported oil.

Most of the recent increase in U.S. oil production comes from hydraulic fracturing of shale and is so-called “light” crude oil. Refining light crude would require new refineries or a major reengineering of existing refineries, with new equipment, expanded capacity or both.

Making those changes would be very expensive. So refinery owners are hesitant to make these kinds of investments because there is a risk that the investments won’t pay off. Because U.S. refineries produce so much gasoline and have limited capacity, the U.S. also continues to import some refined petroleum fuels such as jet fuel.

A fragile power grid

Concern over the nation’s aging electric power grid is another focus of Trump’s energy emergency declaration. Experts have been issuing warnings for years. A 2024 study on the national transmission grid commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy has concluded the U.S. needs to double the size of the grid in the next couple of decades.

For the first time in nearly half a century, the U.S. is facing the prospect of rapidly increasing electricity demand. The demand for power has always gone up and down a bit with population and the health of the economy, but this time is different. Growth in electricity demand is now driven by the construction of massive data centers and by electrification of cars and heating and cooling systems. The Department of Energy reports that data center electricity use in particular has tripled in the past 10 years and could easily double in the next few years. At that rate, data centers could account for over 10% of all electricity demand in the country before 2030.

The U.S. supply of power generation in many regions is not ready for this surge in demand. Many power plants – particularly the older ones and those that burn coal – have shut down in the past several years, driven by a combination of economic pressures and environmental regulations. Building new power plants in many parts of the U.S. has become bogged down in regulatory red tape, public opposition and economic uncertainty. The North American Electric Reliability Corp., which develops standards for grid reliability, has placed over half of U.S. states at some level of risk for not having enough power generation to meet anticipated future demand.

Will declaring an emergency help?

Under Trump’s energy emergency declaration, the administration seems likely to take actions that will make it easier to drill for more oil and gas. And the federal government may also make it easier to build power plants that run on coal, natural gas and possibly nuclear fuel.

But expanded fracking, in and of itself, will probably not address any energy security issues in the U.S., unless there are major investments in refineries to handle the increased oil production. Reducing the barriers to building power plants addresses a much more pressing problem, but the country would still need to expand the transmission grid itself, which does not get as much attention in the president’s declaration.

Time will tell whether the energy emergency declaration will be used to solve real problems in the nation’s energy supplies, or whether it will be used to further bolster oil and gas producers that have already made the U.S. a global energy powerhouse.

Seth Blumsack, Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics and International Affairs, Penn State

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Bedassa Tadesse, University of Minnesota Duluth

Get ready to pay more for avocados, maple syrup and – well – almost everything.

The U.S. officially imposed new 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico on March 4, 2025, following through on a long-delayed pledge from President Donald Trump. American consumers and businesses are now bracing for higher costs and potential supply disruptions.

Although tariffs, or taxes on imports, are a pillar of Trump’s economic policy, the move still surprised many observers, since Mexico and Canada are among the U.S.’s traditional allies and top trading partners. The administration further rattled global supply chains by doubling existing tariffs on Chinese goods to 20%.

As an economist who studies global trade, I wanted to know how the 25% import duties on Canada and Mexico would affect different parts of the country. So I conducted a state-by-state impact analysis.

What I found is alarming: The U.S. economy could face an annual loss of US$109.23 billion. This shortfall would mean rising costs of everyday goods for American families and would disproportionately affect certain states. My analysis focused exclusively on the effects of U.S. tariffs, so it didn’t take retaliation from Canada or Mexico into account. If it did, the losses would be even greater.

Unequal burdens for states, higher prices for families

Imagine your grocery bill surging by 17.5% to 25%, car parts costing hundreds of dollars more, and your favorite local restaurant raising prices as imported ingredients become unaffordable. Because tariffs drive up consumer prices, these scenarios, or others like them, will soon become reality across the U.S.

But not all Americans will be affected equally, I found. States that are deeply connected to North American supply chains will suffer the biggest economic blows. Texas, with its strong trade ties to Mexico and key role in energy, would lose $15.3 billion. California’s diverse economy would take a $10.2 billion hit. Michigan, heavily reliant on auto manufacturing, would face a $6.2 billion blow – over 1% of its gross domestic product.

The biggest losers from the policy on a per-capita basis would be smaller, trade-dependent states that lack the flexibility to absorb such a shock. New Mexico, Kentucky and Indiana would be among the hardest hit, with projected GDP losses ranging from 1.12% to 1.48%. These states rely heavily on manufacturing and specialized industries, making them particularly vulnerable to rising costs and supply chain disruptions.

Take New Mexico. While it may not experience the largest total economic loss, it would bear the highest per-person burden. That $1.73 billion hit to its economy would translate to $822 for every resident – a devastating blow in a state where incomes are already below the national average.

Indeed, the likely effects of tariffs will be felt especially hard by American families. For example, a family of four in New Mexico would see an estimated $3,288 additional annual costs, equivalent to three months of grocery bills or an entire year’s utility expenses. Families in Kentucky and Indiana would also bear heavy financial burdens, paying an extra $3,120 and $2,836, respectively. Even in wealthier states such as Texas, the added annual costs would reach over $2,000 per household.

For middle- and lower-income families, these aren’t trivial costs. They represent difficult trade-offs, forcing households to cut back on essentials, delay major purchases or dip into savings to make ends meet.

Where industry will face a tough hit

Perhaps no industry would suffer more than the auto sector, particularly in states such as Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky. These regions rely on a highly integrated North American supply chain, where components cross borders multiple times before a final product reaches consumers. Tariffs would disrupt this delicate balance, leading to price increases, reduced production and job losses.

My conservative estimate shows that such disruptions could cost the industry approximately $28.2 billion, putting around 680,000 jobs at risk across manufacturing, parts production and sales operations. And the ripple effects would extend beyond automakers to suppliers, dealerships and local economies.

But the pain wouldn’t stop there. Manufacturing, which plays a critical role in 17 of the top 20 states most affected by tariffs, would also face rising costs and shrinking profit margins. The agricultural sector – vital in at least 10 states – would endure higher input costs and potential retaliatory tariffs from Mexico and Canada. Past trade disputes have shown that American farmers often bear the brunt of such policies, with lost export markets and declining revenues.

During the U.S.-China trade war of 2018-2019, for example, American farmers suffered over $27 billion in losses, with soybean exports dropping by 71% and states such as Iowa, Illinois and Kansas losing billions in GDP. The federal government paid affected farmers more than $23 billion to offset these losses. Similar – and possibly worse – challenges loom now.

Retaliation from Mexico and Canada could deal a heavy blow to agricultural exports – including corn, beef and dairy – that anchor local economies, especially in Iowa, Nebraska and Wisconsin. Both countries have threatened countermeasures targeting key U.S. exports, raising concerns among farmers and agribusinesses. Retaliatory tariffs could shrink profit margins, further disrupt supply chains, and create uncertainty for producers relying on these markets.

Looking at the bigger picture

The new Trump tariff regime represents a fundamental shift in how the U.S. engages with its closest economic partners. While ostensibly meant to strengthen American industry, the tariffs on offer have serious side effects that will likely cause widespread disruptions for businesses, consumers and entire state economies.

Trade isn’t just about numbers on a spreadsheet. It’s about real people, real businesses and the intricate economic fabric that connects the nation. Changes to this system can come at a high price. Safeguarding American jobs and ensuring economic stability entails recognizing the realities of global trade and considering the trade-offs of instituting new policies.

While tariffs are one method of disrupting the status quo, they are far from the only way. Indeed, reform is also possible through targeted policies – including negotiated trade agreements, investment incentives and workforce development programs – that address trade concerns without altering deeply integrated supply chains.

Bedassa Tadesse, Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Eunyoung Choi, University of Southern California

What if extreme heat not only leaves you feeling exhausted but actually makes you age faster?

Scientists already know that extreme heat increases the risk of heat stroke, cardiovascular disease, kidney dysfunction and even death. I see these effects often in my work as a researcher studying how environmental stressors influence the aging process. But until now, little research has explored how heat affects biological aging: the gradual deterioration of cells and tissues that increases the risk of age-related diseases.

New research my team and I published in the journal Science Advances suggests that long-term exposure to extreme heat may speed up biological aging at the molecular level, raising concerns about the long-term health risks posed by a warming climate.

Extreme heat’s hidden toll on the body

My colleagues and I examined blood samples from over 3,600 older adults across the United States. We measured their biological age using epigenetic clocks, which capture DNA modification patterns – methylation – that change with age.

DNA methylation refers to chemical modifications to DNA that act like switches to turn genes on and off. Environmental factors can influence these switches and change how genes function, affecting aging and disease risk over time. Measuring these changes through epigenetic clocks can strongly predict age-related disease risk and lifespan.

Research in animal models has shown that extreme heat can trigger what’s known as a maladaptive epigenetic memory, or lasting changes in DNA methylation patterns. Studies indicate that a single episode of extreme heat stress can cause long-term shifts in DNA methylation across different tissue types in mice. To test the effects of heat stress on people, we linked epigenetic clock data to climate records to assess whether people living in hotter environments exhibited faster biological aging.

We found that older adults residing in areas with frequent very hot days showed significantly faster epigenetic aging compared with those living in cooler regions. For example, participants living in locations with at least 140 extreme heat days per year – classified as days when the heat index exceeded 90 degrees Fahrenheit (32.33 degrees Celcius) – experienced up to 14 months of additional biological aging compared with those in areas with fewer than 10 such days annually.

This link between biological age and extreme heat remained even after accounting for a wide range of individual and community factors such as physical activity levels and socioeconomic status. This means that even among people with similar lifestyles, those living in hotter environments may still be aging faster at the biological level.

Even more surprising was the magnitude of the effect – extreme heat has a comparable impact on speeding up aging as smoking and heavy alcohol consumption. This suggests that heat exposure may be silently accelerating aging, at a level on par with other major known environmental and lifestyle stressors.

Long-term public health consequences

While our study sheds light on the connection between heat and biological aging, many unanswered questions remain. It’s important to clarify that our findings don’t mean every additional year in extreme heat translates directly to 14 extra months of biological aging. Instead, our research reflects population-level differences between groups based on their local heat exposure. In other words, we took a snapshot of whole populations at a moment in time; it wasn’t designed to look at effects on individual people.

Our study also doesn’t fully capture all the ways people might protect themselves from extreme heat. Factors such as access to air conditioning, time spent outdoors and occupational exposure all play a role in shaping personal heat exposure and its effects. Some individuals may be more resilient, while others may face greater risks due to preexisting health conditions or socioeconomic barriers. This is an area where more research is needed.

What is clear, however, is that extreme heat is more than just an immediate health hazard – it may be silently accelerating the aging process, with long-term consequences for public health.

Older adults are especially vulnerable because aging reduces the body’s ability to regulate temperature effectively. Many older individuals also take medications such as beta-blockers and diuretics that can impair their heat tolerance, making it even harder for their bodies to cope with high temperatures. So even moderately hot days, such as those reaching 80 degrees Fahrenheit (26.67 degrees Celcius), can pose health risks for older adults.

As the U.S. population rapidly ages and climate change intensifies heat waves worldwide, I believe simply telling people to move to cooler regions isn’t realistic. Developing age-appropriate solutions that allow older adults to safely remain in their communities and protect the most vulnerable populations could help address the hidden yet significant effects of extreme heat.

Eunyoung Choi, Postdoctoral Associate in Gerontology, University of Southern California

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.